|
A majority of French citizens are traditionally concerned about globalization, which is seen as increasing inequalities and threatening jobs. With purchasing power gains for all, but wage losses for some, global trade is reshuffling the social deck. While benefiting the economy as a whole, it penalizes those citizens for whom the fall in consumer prices does not offset the negative effects on their pay slips. On the one hand, there are the winners of globalization, who tend to be young, educated, well-paid and urban dwellers; on the other, there are those whose professional skills are difficult to retrain and who live far from large, diversified employment areas. However, the fact that the pendulum of globalization is swinging in the opposite direction, fragmenting the world economy, should not reassure citizens. This book, which unpacks the channels through which international shocks are transmitted to consumers and the labor market, does not call globalization into question, but rather the inability of public policies to ensure that those left behind benefit.
|
Les citoyens français ont traditionnellement une perception majoritairement inquiète de la mondialisation, qui accroitrait les inégalités et menacerait les emplois. Gain de pouvoir d’achat pour tous, mais perte de salaire pour certains : le commerce mondial redistribue les cartes sociales. Tout en profitant globalement à l’économie, il pénalise les citoyens français pour qui la baisse des prix à la consommation ne compense pas les effets négatifs sur la feuille de paye. Se profilent ainsi, d’un côté, les gagnants de la mondialisation, plutôt jeunes, éduqués, bien rémunérés et citadins, de l’autre ceux dont les compétences professionnelles sont difficilement reconvertibles et qui vivent loin des grands bassins d’emploi diversifiés. Pour autant, le mouvement inverse du balancier de la globalisation, porteur de fragmentation de l’économie mondiale, ne devrait pas rassurer les citoyens. Cet ouvrage qui décrypte les canaux de transmission des chocs internationaux aux consommateurs et au marché du travail, ne met pas en cause la mondialisation mais l’incapacité des politiques publiques à en faire bénéficier les laissés-pour-compte. |
De-industrialization is a long-term process. This shift towards a factory-free economy in high income countries has drawn the attention of policy makers in North America and Europe. Some politicians have articulated alarming views, initiating mercantilist or “beggar-thy-neighbor” cost-competitiveness or protectionist policies. Yet companies that concentrate research and design innovations at home but no longer have any factories there may be the norm in the future.
The evidence in this book suggests that de-industrialization is a process that happens over time in all countries, even China. One implication is that China-bashing is not likely to provide a solution to these long-term trends. Another implication is that the distinction between manufacturing and services is likely to become increasingly blurry. More manufacturing firms are engaging in services activities, and more wholesale firms are engaging in manufacturing.
One optimistic perspective suggests that industrial country firms may be able to exploit the high-value added and skill-intensive activities associated with design and innovation, as well as distribution, which are all components of the global value chain for manufacturing.
A less optimistic picture emerges when we turn to an evaluation of the impact of these trends on industrial country labor markets. While over the longer-term economies may adjust to the shift towards a factory-free economy, in the medium term the personal and therefore the political costs are significant. While this ongoing transformation of industrial economies is consistent with the evolution of their comparative advantage, it has significant short-term costs and requires long-term public policies, all the more so as a side-effect of the new organization of the global economy is the growing importance of large, talent-agglomerating cities. Conversely, territories negatively affected by these changes may elect members with more extremist visions, favoring protectionist policies. This is the great challenge for our democracies: to create the policies and political dialogue that will make structural transformations acceptable to citizens.
The evidence in this book suggests that de-industrialization is a process that happens over time in all countries, even China. One implication is that China-bashing is not likely to provide a solution to these long-term trends. Another implication is that the distinction between manufacturing and services is likely to become increasingly blurry. More manufacturing firms are engaging in services activities, and more wholesale firms are engaging in manufacturing.
One optimistic perspective suggests that industrial country firms may be able to exploit the high-value added and skill-intensive activities associated with design and innovation, as well as distribution, which are all components of the global value chain for manufacturing.
A less optimistic picture emerges when we turn to an evaluation of the impact of these trends on industrial country labor markets. While over the longer-term economies may adjust to the shift towards a factory-free economy, in the medium term the personal and therefore the political costs are significant. While this ongoing transformation of industrial economies is consistent with the evolution of their comparative advantage, it has significant short-term costs and requires long-term public policies, all the more so as a side-effect of the new organization of the global economy is the growing importance of large, talent-agglomerating cities. Conversely, territories negatively affected by these changes may elect members with more extremist visions, favoring protectionist policies. This is the great challenge for our democracies: to create the policies and political dialogue that will make structural transformations acceptable to citizens.